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Thank you for the opportunity to submit this statement before the subcommittee today.
These comments reflect my personal views, rather than those of Georgetown University
or other institutions with which I am affiliated.

Patent Term Extension Within the Hatch-Waxman Act

The Hatch-Waxman Act represents an effort to refine, within the pharmaceutical
industry, the central problem of any intellectual property regime: Encouraging the labors
that lead to innovation, on one hand, and disseminating the fruits of those labors, on the
other. Thus, the Hatch- Waxman Act codified an expedited generic marketing approval
protocol, but also provided for term extension for patents on approved drugs.1 Patent
term extension is unquestionably a fundamental part of a statute that, for all of its
perceived flaws, has been highly successful in both encouraging the generic drug industry
and promoting the discovery and development of new drugs by brandname firms.

Codified at 35 U.S.C. 156, the patent term extension provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act
stands among the most unwieldy statutes in the federal code. One portion of that statute is
relatively clear, however. An application for term extension "may only be submitted
within the sixty-day period beginning on the date the product received permission under
the provision of law under which the applicable regulatory review period occurred for
commercial marketing or use." As this Committee considers modifications to this period,
a few basic substantive points may be worthy of review. First, the Federal Circuit has
interpreted the 60-day deadline strictly. Second, provided that an application is filed
within the statutory period, existing USPTO rules already accord applicants for term
extension some relief in complying with regulatory requirements. Third, term extension
determinations do not entail merely a ministerial calculation. The filing of an application
for patent term extension potentially triggers a fairly elaborate proceeding involving the
USPTO, FDA, and patent proprietor and possibly third parties as well. Fourth, generic
firms reach decisions about pursuing their own applications, along with patent
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challenges, in a relatively tight time frame that is governed by FDA-administered
marketing exclusivities. Because the duration of proprietary rights is obviously
significant concern for these stakeholders, determining entitlement to patent term
extension in a seasonable manner serves important regulatory goals. Finally, both the
Patent Act in general, and the Hatch-Waxman Act in particular, provide that failure to
meet certain deadlines is irremediable. These comments discuss each of these points in
further detail below.

Judicial Precedent. Longstanding judicial precedent has interpreted the 60-day statutory
time period strictly. Notably, in its 1989 decision in Unimed, Inc. v. Quigg, the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit considered an application for term extension of U.S.
Patent No. 3,668,224. The '224 patent described and claimed a process for making
dibenzo-pyran. That compound, known under the trademark MARINOL, is the synthetic
equivalent of an isomer of delta-9- tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), the principal
psychoactive substance in Cannabis sativa L. marijuana. The exclusive licensee of the
'224 patent, Unimed, submitted an NDA to the FDA on June 24, 1981, pursuant to the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.4 The FDA approved the NDA on May 31, 1985,
but reminded Unimed that "MARINOL may not be legally marketed until the Drug
Enforcement Administration has completed rescheduling activities as required by the
Controlled Substances Act."5 This latter step took place on May 13, 1986, when the Drug
Enforcement Administration ("DEA") finalized the removal of MARINOL from
Schedule I to Schedule II of the Controlled Substances Act.6 Unimed filed its application
for extension of the '224 patent term under 35 U.S.C. 156 at the USPTO 14 days later. By
that point, more than one year had elapsed since the FDA had issued marketing approval
for MARINOL.

The USPTO denied Unimed's application, concluding that it had not been filed within
sixty days of receipt of FDA marketing approval. Although the District Court for the
District of Columbia reversed the USPTO's decision,8 on appeal the Federal Circuit again
reversed. Judge Mayer stated the issue crisply: "The timeliness issue boils down to
whether the 60-day period specified in section 156(d)(1) began, as the [USPTO]
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Commissioner argues, when the FDA sent its approval letter, on May 31, 1985, or, as
Unimed argues, when the DEA rescheduled Marinol nearly a year later." Siding with the
USPTO, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the sixty-day period identified in 35 U.S.C.
156(d)(1) commenced "on the date the product received permission under the provision
of law under which the applicable regulatory review period occurred for commercial
marketing or use." 35 U.S.C. 156(g)(1)(B) in turn defined the "applicable regulatory
review period" as section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which
governs the approval of new drugs by the FDA, and nowhere mentioned the role of the
DEA. The Federal Circuit therefore agreed with the USPTO that the 60-day period began
upon the FDA approval date. As a result, the '224 patent term extension application was
considered to have been untimely filed and was therefore rejected.10 It should be
appreciated that both the patent laws and food and drug laws have been amended
numerous times during the 17-year period since the Federal Circuit decided Unimed v.
Quigg. Further, this subcommittee has spent significant time in recent years contemplated
further reforms to the patent laws. To my knowledge, this is the first occasion where the
Congress has considered altering 35 U.S.C. 156.

USPTO Regulations. Agency regulations allow New Drug Application (NDA) holders to
assemble somewhat truncated applications for term extension, with the remainder of the
material to follow. Rulemaking therefore already affords brand-name drug companies the
ability to submit a somewhat condensed application that is more readily prepared during
the 60-day statutory period. In particular, the USPTO has employed its rule-making
authority11 to provide that each application for term extension under 35 U.S.C. 156
include some fifteen elements.12 The USPTO will assign a filing date to an application
for term extension that falls somewhat short of its regulatory standards, however. If the
application (1) identifies the approved product; (2) identifies each federal statute under
which regulatory review occurred; (3) identifies the patent for which an extension is
being sought; (4) identifies each claim of the patent which claims the approved product or
a method of using or manufacturing the approved product; (5) provides sufficient
information to enable the USPTO to determine whether the patent is eligible for
extension, and the rights that will be derived from the extension, and information to
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enable the Director and the Secretary of Health and Human Services or the Secretary of
Agriculture to determine the length of the regulatory review period; and (6) includes a
brief description of the activities undertaken by the marketing applicant during the
applicable regulatory review period with respect to the approved product and the
significant dates applicable to such activities, then the USPTO will accord the application
a filing date.13 This USPTO policy is based on the obligatory nature of these six
elements in a term extension application under 35 U.S.C. 156(d)(1)(A)-(D), while the
remainder of the USPTO requirements were established via regulation.

If the USPTO determines that the term extension application should be accorded a filing
date, but that it does not fully comply with its regulations, the applicant ordinarily has
two months to complete the application.14 The applicant may extend this period through
the payment of additional surcharges in accordance with usual USPTO practice.

The USPTO therefore already provides NDA holders with some flexibility in assembling
their term extension applications, provided of course that the 60-day deadline is met.
Subsequent Proceedings. The submission of a complete application for term extension
under 35 U.S.C. 156 commences a fairly elaborate proceeding involving the USPTO,
FDA, and patent proprietor and possibly third parties as well. In short, within 60 days of
receiving the application, the USPTO will request either the Secretary of Agriculture (if
the product is subject to the Virus- Serum-Toxin Act) or the Secretary of Health and
Human Services (in all other cases) to calculate the applicable "regulatory review
period," which is then published in the Federal Register.

The date of publication is followed by a 180-day period during which any interested party
may file a petition contending that the applicant has not acted with due diligence.16 The
appropriate secretary must determine within 90 days of filing whether the applicant has
acted with due diligence or not, and then publish this determination in the Federal
Register. An interested person may then request an informal hearing on this
determination within 60 days of publication, which is held within 60 days of the request.
Following the hearing, the appropriate Secretary is allotted 30 days to affirm or modify
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its original decision and then notify the USPTO Director. The USPTO then forwards a
Notice of Final Determination to the applicant. The applicant may make a single request
for reconsideration of the determination within one month, or such other time period set
forth in the determination. If no such request for reconsideration is filed, or upon the
completion of its review of such a request, the USPTO will then issue a Certificate of
Extension of Patent Term to the applicant.

In view of these statutory procedures, it should be appreciated that the filing of an
application under 35 U.S.C. 156 does not merely trigger the ministerial calculation of a
particular number of days. Rather, such a filing potentially commences an elaborate
multi-party proceeding. Ensuring that the triggering event for this procedure commences
in a seasonable manner would appear to be an important administrative aspiration.

Generic Responses. FDA approval of an NDA in many cases triggers a response by
generic firms that might be interested in entering that market. Although the HatchWaxman Act includes provisions that create marketing exclusivity for certain FDAapproved drugs, these periods are relatively short in view of the time required for
preparation and regulatory review of an ANDA or 505(b)(2) application. As a result,
generic firms reach decisions about pursuing their own applications, along with patent
challenges, within a relatively tight time frame. Between the duration of proprietary
rights is obviously significant concern for these stakeholders, determining entitlement to
patent term extension in a prompt manner serves important regulatory goals.

Timeliness Within the Patent Law. Given its focus upon novelty, and its requirement of
government intervention to secure rights, the patent law is a temporally focused
discipline. The Patent Act includes numerous deadlines that, if not followed, lead to the
irrevocable forfeiture of patent rights. Most significant among these is the one-year grace
period of 35 U.S.C. 102(b). That public disclosure even one day outside that grace period
voids all patent rights has a severe impact upon individuals unfamiliar with the patent
system, including individuals, small firms, and academics. In contrast, applications for
patent term extension are commonly filed by sophisticated enterprises that have just
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achieved obtained FDA marketing approval-an occasion that is often a watershed in the
life of their firms.

The Hatch-Waxman Act further conditions a number of other benefits upon observance
of fairly tight deadlines. For example, a brand-name firm must file a patent infringement
suit against a paragraph IV ANDA or 505(b)(2) applicant within 45 days in order to
obtain the right to a 30- month stay of marketing approval.23 A generic applicant must
notify the NDA holder and patent proprietor within 20 days of filing its paragraph IV
ANDA or 505(b)(2) application; otherwise, that application will presumably be
considered incomplete.24 A paragraph IV ANDA applicant that files even one day after
another may forfeit entitlement to a 180-day period of generic marketing exclusivity.25
In the context of the Hatch-Waxman Act, the 60-day period established by 35 U.S.C. 156
stands as just one relatively short time frame among many.

Comments on H.R. 5120

In view of this statutory, regulatory, and industrial backdrop, allow me to offer some
observations on H.R. 5120.

The Extent of the Problem. Although I am unsure how many applicants the 60-day filing
deadline for term extension has impacted, to the best of my knowledge this issue has not
been a recurring one. I am uncertain that legislative intervention is required with respect
to this issue. It should also be appreciated that the Hatch-Waxman Act stipulates
numerous deadlines that impose significant obligations over even more compact time
frames. The creation of an additional 5-day window for complying this deadline, as
compared to many others, may strike many observers as anomalous.

The Standard for Obtaining 5-Day Period. H.R. 5120 would require the USPTO to
determine whether "the delay in filing the application was unintentional." Although I
have no doubt that the USPTO will administer any standard that Congress stipulates at a
high level of professional ability, the lack of an objective basis for assessing entitlements
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to patent term extension strikes me as troubling. If the Congress means to say that
obviously no rational actor would intentionally waive valuable periods of term extension,
then I would encourage a simple extension of the deadline to 61, 65, or some other period
of days that is greater than 60. Alternatively, if Congress wishes to compel a substantive
inquiry into the fulfillment of professional obligations by the applicant or its counsel, I
would suggest that this inquiry would undoubtedly be a thorny one. The USPTO plainly
has more important tasks at hand, and should be allowed to pursue its core
responsibilities without having to engage in this manner of endeavor.

The Potential Advantages of Prospective Application. I am unsure how many other
stakeholders have established a reliance interest based upon the events of any one failure
to comply with the statutory deadline. To the extent that legislation is considered
desirable, the common mandate that the legislation applies only on a prospective basis
strikes me as a superior alternative. Other Section 156 Issues. Now that the subcommittee
has extended its gaze to 35 U.S.C. 156, it should be aware that this statute has raised
other thorny issues that may be amenable to legislative reform. Following the Federal
Circuit opinion in Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, brand-name firms
possess a greater ability to select individual patents for term extension with respect to
medical devices than with respect to pharmaceuticals. In addition, in Arnold Partnership
v. Dudas, the Federal Circuit has interpreted the statute in such a way effectively to
eliminate the possibility of patent term extension for combination therapies. Although the
court of appeals read the precise language of 156 fairly in both cases, in my opinion this
reading unfairly limits the availability of term extension both for pharmaceuticals in
general, and for combination therapies in particular. The subcommittee may wish to
address these issues as it considers reforming the Hatch-Waxman Act's term extension
provisions.

Legislative Alternatives. Finally, to the extent that H.R. 5120 is motivated by a single
incident, a different legislative alternative might be more appropriate. Another option is
to promote a private term extension bill in favor of the particular patent involved. Such
legislation might more effectively convey to the public the motivation for the legislation
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and focus attention upon relevant stakeholders in this particular circumstance. Thank you
again for the opportunity to submit this statement.
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